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Abstract 
This paper discusses the findings of a research project which explored the impact of 
organisational responses on drinking water quality in England and Wales, and the 
Republic of Ireland. The paper also focuses on advancing our understanding of how 
organisations can be understood as affecting the transposition of policy responses 
designed to regulate the quality of drinking water. To achieve this aim, the study 
draws upon three hypotheses to account for the impact organisations have upon the 
transposition of policy. In particular, the selected hypotheses focus attention on the 
impact of conflicting organisational interests, organisational policy traditions, 
and the role played by agencies that are supportive of policy goals. It is 
established that drinking water quality has been of a consistently higher standard in 
England and Wales in comparison with the Republic of Ireland. It is also 
demonstrated that the associated organisational responses in England and Wales have 
been more successful in tackling certain problematic drinking water quality 
parameters. The paper concludes by arguing that although the selected hypotheses 
have proven useful in focusing our understanding of how organisations affect policy 
transposition, greater consideration needs to be given to understanding the impacts 
adequate finance, organisational networks, organisational fragmentation, and 
organisational independence from government, have on policy transposition.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper establishes the quality of drinking water in England and Wales and the 
Republic of Ireland, and the organisational responses associated with it, for the period 
1970 to 2002. It also aims to further our understanding of how organisations involved 
in the delivery of drinking water can be understood as having affected the 
transposition of policy responses designed to regulate the quality of drinking water. 
To achieve this aim, this study draws upon three hypotheses proposed by Winter  
(1990, 2003) to account for the impact organisations have on policy transposition and 
outcomes. In particular, these hypotheses focus attention on the impact of conflicting 
organisational interests, organisational policy traditions, and the role played by 
agencies that are supportive of policy goals. The standards laid down by the Drinking 
Water Directive 80/778/EEC are used to provide the analytical backdrop for 
evaluating the quality of drinking water. 
 
In summary, the paper establishes the organisational provision of drinking water in 
England/Wales and Ireland to diverge in three broad areas; namely, with regard to the 
role of government in provision; the role of government in finance; and the role of 
government in regulation. From a general perspective, the quality of drinking water in 
England/Wales is shown to have been of a consistently higher standard than in 
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comparison with Ireland, which is subsequently revealed as having developed a less 
effective organisational response to the delivery and regulation of drinking water 
quality. Winter’s organisational hypotheses are subsequently revealed as being useful, 
but limited, in helping us to understanding of how organisations have affected the 
quality of drinking water and its regulation.  
 
To explore the quality of drinking water and the associated organisational responses 
in England/Wales and Ireland, this paper has been split into five main sections. The 
first section provides a brief overview of the methodology, the second establishes the 
quality of drinking water in England/Wales and Ireland; the third details the 
associated organisational responses, the fourth draws upon Winter’s organisational 
thinking to help us understand the impact organisational responses have had on policy 
implementation and drinking water quality; and conclusions are drawn in the final 
section.  
 
 
METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW 
To allow an investigation into the quality of drinking water and the associated 
organisational responses, and their impacts to take place, data was collected from a 
series of semi-structured interviews conducted with senior civil servants and 
managers in England/Wales, Ireland and Brussels. Interviewees were selected to help 
generate a contemporary understanding for the period 1970 and 2002. The 
information collected was supplemented with information derived from reports and 
papers from parliamentary committees and proceedings, government departments, EU 
organisations and institutions, privately commissioned research, interviewee articles 
and conference presentations. The Times and Irish Times were also consulted to aid in 
the construction of a contemporary picture of implementation. The quality of drinking 
water was ascertained from analysis of published annual reports on the quality of 
drinking water.  
 
Interviewees were selected to represent the organisations and individuals associated 
with the transposition of Directive 80/778/EEC. This directive was selected, and 
subsequently served to guide the timeframe of this project, because of the central and 
fundamental role it has played in drinking water regulation in the European Union 
(Breach, 1989; CEC, 1980; Collins, 1988; Kramer, 2000; NSCA, 2000; Semple, 
1993). In Ireland, a total of 19 interviews were undertaken with individuals from the 
Department of the Environment and Local Government (DOELG), the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA). Individuals from the providers of water services were also 
selected for interview, which included Dublin City Council, Fingal County Council, 
Rathdown County Council, and South Dublin City Council. In England/Wales, a total 
of 33 interviews were undertaken with individuals from the Department for 
Environment Food and Rural Affairs, the Office of Water Services (Ofwat), the 
Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI), and WaterVoice. Representatives of the 
providers of water services in the London area, namely Thames Water and Three 
Valleys Water, in addition to individuals from national representative groups such as 
Water UK, were also selected for interview. At the EU level a total of 12 individuals 
were interviewed, being drawn from the EC and the European Parliament (EP). 
Individuals were also selected for interview from the European Union of National 
Associations of Water Suppliers and Waste Water Services (EUREAU).   
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DRINKING WATER QUALITY AND THE DIRECTIVE 
To ascertain the quality of drinking water the following analysis has been split into 
two main sections. The first section focuses on water quality in England/Wales and 
Ireland during the 1970s and 1980s. The second section focuses on the quality of 
drinking water in England/Wales and Ireland between 1990 and 2002. This split 
represents the two periods before and after data on drinking water quality were 
coordinated and published nationally on an annual basis.  
 
Drinking water quality in England/Wales and Ireland 1970 to 1989 
From 1970 to 1989, Ireland is notable for lacking nationally collated data on drinking 
water quality and exhibiting little public or media commentary on the quality of 
drinking water. This lack of data was commented on three years after Ireland was 
supposed to be compliant with standards in Directive 80/778/EEC. Hence, in 1988, an 
administrative circular issued by the Irish DOELG remarked that:  
 
‘The Department has relatively little information on the monitoring of toxic 
parameters […] insofar as drinking water is concerned’ (Circular L8/88 
DOELG [Ireland]: 1). 
 
Concern over contamination of surface and groundwater by organic and inorganic 
substances, like nitrate and pesticides, began to emerge in Ireland during the 1970s. 
Yet contamination was not believed to affect the quality of drinking water adversely 
(see Flanagan and Toner, 1972; IIRS, 1975; O’Donnell, 1980; Toner and Lennox, 
1980; Daly and Daly, 1984; Water Resources Division, 1986). A lack of commentary 
on drinking water quality in the debates of the Dáil Eireann (i.e. Parliament in 
Republic of Ireland) provides further confirmation of low levels of concern amongst 
Members of Parliament during the 1970s and 1980s. Where concern was identified, 
its appears to have been limited to one-off phenol contamination in North Dublin, 
which was not taken to be indicative of wider quality problems (see DE Debs., Vol. 
346, 22-11-83). Only toward the end of the 1980s did direct questions and data 
relating to the quality of drinking water begin to emerge, in particular with regard to 
the level of nitrate contained in ground water (see DE Debs., Vol. 392, 02-11-89). It 
appears that during the 1970s and 1980 drinking water quality in Ireland was of little 
concern, or was perceived not be a concern. In a sense there are parallels here 
between Ireland and England/Wales, for in the latter the debate surrounding the 
quality of drinking water similarly focused on contamination by one or two 
substances. Thus, in the 1970s and 1980s, an emerging concern about contamination 
by lead and nitrate was identified (Pearce, 1982).  
 
In 1976, a UK survey on lead in drinking water revealed contamination to be far more 
widespread than previously thought (DoE, 1977; Atkinson, 1978). The report 
highlighted that while lead rarely occurs as a widespread natural contaminant, it tends 
to be present in drinking water due to the plumbosolvency of drinking water supplies 
(Nicolson, 1993). Prior to this survey, it was believed that only soft water dissolved 
lead from water pipes made from the metal. As a result of taking 2,600 samples, it 
was revealed that both soft and hard water had a plumbosolvency effect, and that the 
contamination of drinking water was more widespread that previously thought. 
During the course of the 1970s, concern also began to be attached to the level of 
nitrate in drinking water. In particular, nitrate contamination became of increased 
concern following the 1976 drought. This caused a sharp increase in concentrations in 
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surface waters, with rising nitrate levels detected in groundwater in years following 
the drought. This caused suppliers of drinking water to consider other sources of 
groundwater supply (Atkinson, 1978). A further indicator of variable water quality 
was a 1984 government reply to a parliamentary enquiry on the number of suppliers 
breaching microbiological standards in Directive 80/778/EEC. It was reported that 90 
water supply areas, out of an unspecified number, were falling ‘marginally short of 
the EC drinking water directive’s microbiological standards at present’ (HC Debs., 
Vol. 84, 21-1-85, Col 551). The above information appears to indicate that problems 
relating to drinking water quality were isolated to a series of specific parameters and 
sources. However, the reported 1982 comments of Dr John Cuthbert, the then 
Director of the Water Research Centre’s Stevenage process engineering laboratories, 
appears to indicate a more dire picture. He reported to the National Water Council and 
to Government ministers that 50 per cent of all British water supplies failed to meet 
some part of the Directive (Pearce, 1982: 114).  
 
Drinking water quality in England/Wales and Ireland 1990 to 2002 
This section presents the results of a comparative analysis of drinking water quality in 
England/Wales and Ireland for the period 1990 to 2002. It draws upon publicly 
available reports on drinking water quality. The starting point of 1990 represents the 
year data first become available in both national contexts. The end point of 2002 is the 
end point for data analysis as it represents the end of the data collection phase for this 
study. Overall compliance levels and levels for the individual standards relating to 
lead, nitrate, total coliforms, aluminium, iron, and pesticides are examined. As Figure 
1 illustrates, the overall quality drinking water quality is higher in England/Wales 
than in Ireland.  
 
Between 1990 and 2002, the percentage compliance ratings for drinking water quality 
in England/Wales and Ireland improved, with England/Wales exhibiting a 
consistently higher overall compliance. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the overall 
compliance in England/Wales increased from 98.82% to 99.85% (an increase of 
1.03%). While in Ireland it increased from 93.21% to 95.90% (an increase of 2.69%). 
In both cases, the overall improvement was relatively small in percentage terms, yet 
overall compliance masks important and dramatic improvements in non-compliance 
failures for certain parameters.  
 
Figures 2 through 5 illustrate a pronounced rise in the percentage of tests in 
England/Wales meeting the Directive’s prescribed standards for nitrate, total 
coliforms, aluminium and iron. In particular, between 1990 to 2002, the percentage of 
tests not meeting the standard for nitrate fell from 0.77% to 0.11% (see Figure 2); for 
total coliforms it fell from 2.00% to 0.52% (see Figure 3); for aluminium from 0.90% 
to 0.07% (see Figure 4); and for iron from 3.00% to 0.83% (Figure 5).  
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Figure 1. Drinking water quality in England/Wales and Ireland between 1990 and 
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(Source: DWI, 1991-2003; EPA, 1991-2003) 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The percentage rating for overall compliance was calculated in relation to parameters reported in 
annual reports. In the case of England/Wales, the parameters reported include: total coliforms; faecal 
coliforms; colour; turbidity; odour; taste; hydrogen ion; nitrate; nitrite; aluminium; iron; manganese; 
lead; PAH (polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons); trihalomethanes; total pesticides (all pesticide sampled 
for); individual pesticides (e.g. simazine; atrazine; propyzamide); all others (refers to 38 other 
parameters regularly tested for but rarely found at non-compliant levels [e.g. copper; zinc; 
temperature]). In relation to Ireland, the parameters reported upon include: aluminium; ammonium; 
total and faecal coliforms; colour; fluoride; heavy metals (e.g. copper, zinc, cadmium; lead); iron; 
manganese; nitrate; nitrite; odour; taste; pH; trihalomethanes; turbidity; cryptosporidium (EPA, 2003).  
2
 It is acknowledged that use of a linear trend line is not ideal for 13 observations. The line has only 
been used to highlight the overall trend in the data presented.  
3
 In 2002 the EPA decided to discontinue calculating an overall compliance rating for drinking water 
quality in relation to the parameters detailed in footnote 10 (EPA, 2003). Discussion by the EPA of 
parameters would either make sole reference to the overall percentage compliance rating for a 
parameter, or break it down with regard to group and public water schemes. No data were then 
provided on the number of samples passed or failed in group and/or public water schemes. As a 
consequence, it is not possible to calculate overall compliance because the number of samples analysed 
in group and public water schemes is not known.  
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Figure 2. Drinking water quality in England/Wales and Ireland in relation to nitrates, 
1990-2002 
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Figure 3. Drinking water quality in England/Wales and Ireland in relation to total 
coliforms, 1990-2002 
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Figure 4. Drinking water quality in England/Wales and Ireland in relation to 
aluminium, 1990-2002 
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Figure 5. Drinking water quality in England/Wales and Ireland in relation to iron, 
1990-2002 
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As noted previously, Figure 1 reveals clearly that Ireland has achieved a consistently 
lower overall compliance rating for drinking water quality, when compared to 
England/Wales. The annual drinking water reports, and the action plans for rural 
drinking water in Ireland, highlight that the overall quality of drinking water is 
lowered due to the poorer quality of water produced by group water schemes. In the 
context of Ireland, group water schemes refer to drinking water distributed by 
privately owned schemes that source and distributes their own supplies of drinking 
water (NFGWS, 2003). According to the Irish Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), group water schemes supply water of a lower quality because of 
contamination with animal and human waste and a lack of chlorination (EPA, 1999). 
 
Assessing the effect of group water schemes on the overall quality of drinking water 
in Ireland has proved difficult, as annual reports have not always broken down quality 
data by group and public water schemes. As Figure 6 illustrates, the data available 
only allows assessment of overall quality supplied in relation to group and public 
water schemes back to 2000. What is notable is that drinking water from both group 
and public water supplies in Ireland is of a lower quality than in England/Wales (see 
Figure 6), suggesting that while group water schemes have had a negative impact on 
the overall result for drinking water quality in Ireland, their presence does not account 
for differences across the two national contexts.   
 
Figure 6. Overall drinking water compliance in relation to public and group water 
schemes in Ireland, 2000-2002 
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THE ORGANISATIONAL RESPONSE 
To enable the organisational response of governments in England/Wales and Ireland 
to be established and discussed, the following discussion is split in two. The first 
section covers the organisational response of government in Ireland to water services 
with the second section detailing the organisational responses in England/Wales from 
1973 to 2002. 
 
Drinking water provision in Ireland 
Between 1973 and 2002, drinking water provision in Ireland was the responsibility of 
88 local authorities
4
 and a growing number of group water schemes (European 
Communities [Quality of Water Intended for Human Consumption] Regulations, 
1988). The delivery of water services is currently the responsibility of 88 local 
authorities, which supply approximately 90% of the population, and approximately 
5,500 group water schemes, which supply approximately 10% of the population 
(EPA, 2003; EPA, 2005; Oasis, 2006; Scannell, 1995; 2005). Despite their 
‘independence’, the group water schemes are under the statutory management of the 
local authorities who are responsible for monitoring and enforcing the quality 
standards contained within the Directive. Local authorities are then overseen by the 
Irish Department of the Environment (DOELG), who are responsible for Directive 
80/778/EEC (Scannell, 1976; 1982; Quinn, 1992; Coyle, 1994; McGowan, 1999; 
OECD 2000; Taylor, 2001; NFGWS, 2003; 2004). 
 
Following the 1988 European Communities (Quality of Water Intended for Human 
Consumption) Regulations, the Environmental Research Unit of the Irish environment 
department began to produce an annual, publicly available, report on drinking water 
quality. Prior to 1988, the enforcement of drinking water quality regulations rested 
with the local authorities themselves (Coyle, 1994; Scanell, 1995; Taylor, 2001). In 
1993, this responsibility passed to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (EPA 
Act 1992). In addition to monitoring and reporting on the quality of drinking water, 
the EPA is also responsible for monitoring and reporting on the quality of the wider 
water environment, and enforcing regulations with regard to waste and air pollution. 
The EPA is reliant upon water providers for data on the quality of drinking water 
(EPA, 2003b).  
 
Between 1973 and 2002, the funding of water services underwent a series of notable 
changes in Ireland. Prior to 1978, water services provided by local authorities were 
funded via a mix of central government grants and revenue generated by domestic 
rates, which included a charge for water services (Ridge, 1992; Collins and Cradden, 
1993). In relation to private group water schemes, users pay a subsidised rate for the 
services that are provided, with local authorities subsidising such schemes with the 
aid of central government grants (Collins and Cradden, 1993). However, domestic 
rates for water services, and thus the contribution of domestic users to the cost of 
water services in urban areas, were abolished
5
 in 1978. To replace the loss in revenue, 
central government allocated an increased grant to local authorities in the form of a 
domestic rate grant (Ridge, 1992; Collins and Cradden, 1993).  However, in 1982-
1983 central government stopped making up this financial shortfall by decoupling the 
domestic rate grant from the locally determined domestic rates. This situation allowed 
                                                 
4
 Also known as public water scheme providers. 
5
 County councils in rural areas retained the right to charge for domestic water supplies until 1997. 
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the Treasury increasingly to determine what was spent at the local level (see Ridge, 
1992).  
 
In 1982, an Irish government circular enabled local authorities once again to charge 
for water services (Ridge, 1992; Collins and Cradden, 1993). In the context of a 
national fiscal crisis, the central government announced a decrease of eight per cent in 
the central grant levels to local authorities. Yet local authorities were allowed to 
mitigate the effects of this decrease somewhat by levying specific charges for the 
services they provided, such as water; although the national government did restrict 
the amount that local authorities could spend on local services, so as to manage the 
national fiscal crisis. As a consequence, expenditure on water services fell (see Ridge, 
1992; Taylor, 1998, 2001). This decrease occurred because the national government 
sought to bring about economic stability by reducing inflation via a reduction in 
expenditure on public services (see Collins and Cradden, 1993; Coakley and 
Gallagher, 1999).  
  
In response to their newly acquired revenue raising authority, by 1996 all but two 
local councils in Ireland (Dublin and Limerick) had developed some form of charging 
for water services, via the development and specification of an actual charge for water 
services in the annual rates bills sent to domestic householders (Collins and Cradden 
1997). Despite the calculation and specification of charges for water services, in 1997 
domestic user charges were once again discontinued, even though the direct billing 
and metering of business users has become increasingly commonplace (OECD, 2000; 
DOELG, 2004). Serving to complicate the funding of water services in Ireland 
further, group water schemes that are supplied with drinking water by local authorities 
also had their service charges abolished in 1997. However, users of private group 
water schemes still have to pay, albeit they are subsided by the relevant local 
authority. As consequence of the above changes, the DOELG has become responsible 
for financing the provision of water services via revenue generated from income tax. 
For the period 1994 to 1999, EU cohesion and structural funding also contributed to 
the funding of water services in Ireland, with this funding substantially decreasing 
between 2000 and 2006. This decrease occurred because of Ireland’s improving 
financial situation relative to the rest of the EU (DOELG, 2002; 2004; Oasis, 2006).  
 
Drinking water provision in England/Wales 
For the period 1973 to 1988, water services in England/Wales were delegated to 
Regional Water Authorities (RWAs) and Statutory Water Companies.6 The RWAs 
were responsible for the delivery and regulation of sewerage and drinking water 
services. They were created as a result of the 1973 Water Act (Severn Trent Water 
Authority, 1980; Hassan, 1996; Summerton, 1998, Richardson, 2002), which brought 
about a marked rationalisation and regionalisation of water services in England/Wales 
(Parker and Sewell, 1988; Hassan, 1996). Prior to 1973, 157 water undertakings, 29 
river authorities and 1,398 sanitary authorities existed in England/Wales. As a 
consequence of the 1973 Water Act, the responsibilities and functions of these various 
bodies were transferred to just 10 RWAs (Parker and Sewell, 1988; Hassan, 1996).  
 
                                                 
6
 The term statutory water company refers to companies that were established via a UK Act of 
Parliament to provide drinking water only. 
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This rationalisation shifted control of water resources away from the above authorities 
to large multi-regional service and regulatory management bodies (Hassan, 1996; 
Summerton, 1998). These RWAs took the form of nationalised industries in an 
organisational and constitutional sense. For instance, they were managed by a board 
appointed jointly by Ministers and local authorities (Summerton, 1998). Although 
each authority was legally distinct from central government and could determine their 
own spending priorities, Ministers were able to ‘constrain’ the actions of RWAs via 
the issuing of general and special directions, and the imposition of cash limits on new 
capital investment (Summerton, 1998). According to Saunders (1985), further 
government attempts to improve the efficiency of RWAs were driven by a belief that 
greater central bureaucratic control of public services was best able to help Britain 
respond to a period of economic decline and readjustment.  
 
In 1989, the delivery of water services in England/Wales underwent major reform, 
passing entirely into the hands of the private sector as a consequence of the 1989 
Water Act. The ten RWAs, created as a result of the 1973 Water Act, were floated on 
the London Stock Exchange (OECD, 1994, van den Berg, 1997; Richardson, 2002). 
In addition, 29 statutory water supply-only companies were allowed to float 
themselves on the stock market, if they so desired. As a consequence, a series of water 
company mergers took place, resulting in 19 statutory water companies by 1996 
(OECD, 1994; Richardson, 2002)7. Currently, the privatised water industry is 
responsible for supplying approximately 99% of all drinking water in England/Wales 
(DWI, 2003)8. 
 
In England/Wales, Section 60 of the 1989 Water Act empowered Secretaries of State 
for the Environment to appoint technical assessors to act on their behalf in the 
assessment and regulation of drinking water quality. Prior to this Act, the DoE was 
itself responsible for monitoring the quality of drinking water at the national level. 
This was done through sampling data supplied to it by the providers of water services, 
who were also responsible for the enforcement of drinking water quality standards. As 
a consequence of the 1989 Water Act, the Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI) was 
established and charged with the task of monitoring and reporting on the safety of 
drinking water (DWI, 2004: 1). 
 
Between 1970 and 1988, water services in England/Wales were funded via a changing 
mixture of charging of water users in relation to the rateable property value, RWA 
cross subsidisation, and funding from the Treasury (Parker and Sewell, 1988; WAA, 
1988; Summerton, 1998). Following the reorganisation of the water industry by the 
1973 Water Act, the Rate Support Grant from central government was removed. This 
meant that, for the first time, consumers began to pay more realistic water supply 
costs, albeit varying slightly due to the historic debts the RWAs had inherited (Parker 
and Sewell, 1988). Domestic customers were charged for water services according to 
the ‘rateable value’ of their properties, which continues to this day, with water 
charging still loosely related to rateable value (Parker and Sewell, 1988). Central to 
                                                 
7
 The duties of the water service companies and the water only companies are the same with regards to 
drinking water (Water Act [England], 1989). 
8
 Approximately 1% of the population in England/Wales has its water needs met via private water 
supplies. The source of such supplies can include water drawn from a well, borehole, spring, stream, 
river, lake or pond (DWI, 2000).  
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this funding arrangement is the ability of government to control expenditure and 
borrowing within the water industry, with both subject to the external finance limits: 
 
‘(the) external finance limit (EFL) is the amount the authority can raise 
from external sources. The overall limit for the industry is allocated as 
part of the Governments public sector borrowing requirement’ (WAA, 
1988: 27) 
In England/Wales, as a consequence of privatisation, the Government no longer 
considers the financing of the water industry to be part of the public sector borrowing 
requirement (Hassan, 1995; Bakker, 2005). This has paved the way for the 
application of ‘direct cost’ recovery with regard to the delivery of water services9. To 
oversee the effective application and functioning of economic principles in a 
monopoly dominated market place, and in similarity with previous network utility 
privatisations, government established the Office of Water Services (Ofwat) was in 
1989 to act as an economic regulator (Bakker, 2001; Ofwat 2004).  
 
 
BRIEF INSIGHTS INTO THE IMPACTS OF ORGANISATIONS 
Winter (1990, 2003) suggests that policy responses will fail if organisations that are 
responsible for transposing policy have institutional interests and incentives that 
conflict with the policy goals ascribed to them. With regard to drinking water quality 
in England/Wales and Ireland, and its regulation via Directive 80/778/EEC, Winter’s 
organisational focus is useful in focusing the researchers attention on particular 
aspects of the organisational response and why these may have had an impact on 
drinking water quality and transposition of associated policy. In particular, he draws 
attention to three key areas, namely: conflicting organisational goals, conflicting 
policy traditions, and the positive role played by supportive organisations.  
 
During the 1980s, in comparison to today, the economies of England/Wales and 
Ireland were subject to greater inflationary pressures than is the case today. As the 
providers of water services in both cases were then under state control, such macro-
economic pressures resulted in expenditure on water services being limited by 
government treasury departments. This management of the macro-economy delayed 
the implementation of water directives, as the providers of water services were not 
able to adequately finance the infrastructure necessary to ensure the quality standards 
of EU water policy were met. Commenting upon this situation, a former senior civil 
servant in England/Wales recalled that:  
 
‘Whilst the government did not directly finance the water authorities, their 
borrowing was subject to Government control, and the total amount of 
public sector borrowing was strictly limited for macro-economic reasons. At 
a time when concern for the environment was rapidly increasing, and new 
Directives from Brussels were imposing the need for massive investment in 
water services, the Government was forced for economic reasons to apply 
limitations to capital expenditure that prevented the environmental 
objectives being achieved –objectives to which the Government was 
committed and for the achievement of which it was responsible. This is a 
classic dilemma, but was nevertheless clearly embarrassing and indeed 
unacceptable’ (Semple, 2001, speech given at ENGREF University). 
                                                 
9
 Direct, within the context of this thesis, serves to imply that consumers of drinking water are directly 
billed for the full cost of the volume of water services they consume. 
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In the specific context of implementing the Drinking Water Directive (80/778/EEC) 
in England/Wales and Ireland, it has been said that such macro-economic 
management of the economy did lead to the implementation of the Directive being 
affected, as the following interviewee remarks substantiate:  
 
‘There was under-investment in the 1980s due to the poor state of Ireland’s 
economy. This would have had an impact upon meeting the demands of the 
Drinking Water Directive…Remember though, there was work going on but 
not enough’ (Senior Civil Servants DOELG [Ireland], per. comm.). 
 
‘You have to remember that during the 70s the UK was in a bad shape 
economically, it had to go to the IMF twice. This resulted in public 
expenditure constraints that were felt throughout the 1980s, since water 
companies’ expenditure was considered part of public expenditure they 
were not immune to cutbacks…and yes, this did affect the Directive’ (Senior 
Civil Servant V DoE [England/Wales], per. comm.).  
 
This situation clearly supports Winter’s assertion that conflicting organisational 
interests can impact upon the effectiveness of how policy objectives are responded 
too.  
 
In discussing the impact organisations can have upon the implementation of policy, 
Winter (1990, 2003) draws attention to the negative impact policy traditions can have 
upon implementation, particularly if they are in conflict with the policy goals. 
Departments of the environment in England/Wales and Ireland initially adopted 
Directive 80/778/EEC via departmental circulars which were not legally binding, with 
the standards of the Directive viewed as ‘aspirational’. This somewhat informal non-
legalistic approach to the adoption of Directive 80/778/EEC clashed with the 
regulatory approach of the Directive, which was setting water quality standards that 
had to be achieved and were legally binding. In particular, for senior civil servants in 
England/Wales and Ireland the standards contained in the Directive were viewed in an 
‘aspirational’ light: 
 
‘During the early 1980s the UK thought that EU environmental policy 
legislation was purely aspirational…This view changed as a result of a 
European Court of Justice ruling in early to mid 1980s, which ruled that 
European Union environmental measures were legally binding…This in 
context of the government of the day, brought about a sea of change in 
attitudes towards EU environmental legislation’ (Senior Civil Servant IV 
DoE [England/Wales], per. comm.). 
‘The standards embodied in the Directive were seen as aspirational and not 
as hard and fast objectives to be met’ (Senior Civil Servant I DOELG 
[Ireland], per. comm.). 
 
This ‘aspirational’ view was not confined solely to England/Wales and Ireland, but 
was prevalent amongst other Member States: 
‘To begin with, Member States in general did not take the Drinking Water 
Directive seriously…They considered the Directive to just be establishing 
standards that Member States may like to work towards’ (Senior 
Environment Commission Official I, per. comm.). 
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In response to legal actions by the Environment Commission and the ECJ, national 
departments of the environment were forced to change their organisational regulatory 
attitudes. However, while this change in attitudes was being brought about delays and 
failures of implementation were occurring, resulting in problems with the quality of 
drinking water. As a consequence of the legal actions taken by the Environment 
Commission, the transposition response of environment departments in 
England/Wales and Ireland has become more legalistic and formal over time, much in 
the same way it has in relation to other areas of EU water and environmental policy 
implementation (see Gouldson and Murphy, 1998; Lowe and Ward, 1998; Weale et 
al., 2000; Taylor, 2001).  
 
Winter’s ‘integrated’ model suggests that implementation is improved if assigned to 
supporting agencies. In both national contexts, the state in England/Wales and Ireland 
has acted to create state sponsored agencies charged with implementing the Directive. 
As discussed previously, Ireland established the EPA in 1993, with one of its core 
responsibilities being the monitoring of drinking water quality in relation to the 
Directives’ standards. In England/Wales, the DWI was established in 1989 with the 
sole responsibility of monitoring and reporting on the quality of drinking water. While 
it would be incorrect to say that the creation of such regulatory agencies solely 
brought about improvements in drinking water quality, their creation supports 
Winter’s assertion that implementation is improved if assigned to supporting 
agencies. Interviewees in England/Wales believed that:  
 
‘The existence of the Drinking Water Inspectorate has undoubtedly had a 
considerable impact on the attitudes of the industry to water quality, and the 
strict but fair policies give it a high degree of credibility all round’ (Jack 
Jeffery [former chairman of Three Valleys Water], 1992: 4,). 
 
Similar views were forthcoming in relation to the role played by the EPA in Ireland: 
 
‘The EPA has been useful in policing drinking water and facilitating 
comparisons of council performance with regards to the quality of drinking 
water supply…it has helped provide a coherent focus’ (Senior 
Representative Dublin City Council, per. comm.). 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
To enable the findings of this study to be summarised and appropriate conclusions 
drawn about drinking water quality and associated organisational responses in 
England/Wales and Ireland, this section has been split into three sections. The first 
section summarises the study’s finding with regard to water quality. The second 
section details the key organisational differences in relation to the provision of 
drinking water and its regulation. The final section discusses the usefulness of 
Winter’s organisational focus in furthering our understanding of the impact 
organisations have had on drinking water quality and its regulation.  
 
Drinking water quality. This paper has established that the quality of drinking water 
in England/Wales and Ireland to have been a problem of growing concern in the 
1970s and 1980s. In England/Wales, available historical data indicates the role of 
government-sponsored research in helping establish the extent of drinking water 
quality problems. However, in Ireland there was little public reporting and concern 
over the quality of drinking water. From the data identified, major problems relating 
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to drinking water revolved around contamination by lead and nitrate, particularly in 
England/Wales. In Ireland, this issue was particularly poorly documented. While 
reports highlighted a growing risk of contamination by nitrate, there were no specific 
reports on the contamination of drinking water, as occurred in England/Wales.  
 
Between 1990 and 2002, the drinking water quality data contained in the annual 
national monitoring reports for England/Wales and Ireland demonstrates 
England/Wales to have obtained a higher overall level of compliance with standards 
laid down by Directive 80/778/EEC. The data also served to show that England/Wales 
have managed to bring about far more significant improvements in drinking water 
quality with regards to particular parameters. Within Ireland, group water schemes 
have been found to have a significant impact on the overall quality of drinking water 
nationally, as their compliance record is poorer than that for public schemes.  
However, it is of note that these water schemes do not account sufficiently for 
Ireland’s lower overall compliance rating and higher compliance failures with 
‘problem parameters’. Both public and group water schemes demonstrate higher 
failure rates in comparison with England/Wales.  
 
Organisational responses. The provision of drinking water in England/Wales and 
Ireland diverges in three broad areas; namely, with regard to the role of government in 
provision; the role of government in finance; and the role of government in regulation. 
 
Firstly, they differ with regard to the role government has come to play in the 
provision of drinking water. In Ireland, the national government has remained 
responsible for the delivery of drinking water via local authorities (in the main), and, 
to a not insignificant extent, through group water schemes. In contrast, since 1989, 
drinking water supply has been the responsibility of the private sector in 
England/Wales. This aside, the provision of drinking water in Ireland is significantly 
more fragmented than in England/Wales. So, while only 29 companies are responsible 
for the provision of drinking water to a population of 52 million in England/Wales, in 
Ireland drinking water is supplied to a population of just 3.9 million by some 88 local 
authorities and approximately 5,500 group water schemes. Industry and government 
officials in Ireland note that the organisational fragmentation of drinking water caused 
by group water schemes has hindered achievement of the Directive’s quality 
standards. This is due to the operators of such schemes lacking an awareness of 
current treatment techniques and to the limited funds government was able and 
willing to allocate to tackling problems of non-compliance by such schemes. 
 
The second key difference concerns the financing of drinking water supply by 
national government. Since 1989, water services in England/Wales have been subject 
to the principle of full cost recovery via application of the user pays principle for all 
users, meaning that the consumer pays the full costs associated with receiving 
services. By contrast, since 1997, the Irish state has stopped charging domestic 
consumers for water services. Ireland has instead preferred to finance the provision of 
water services via general taxation. Therefore, it can be argued that the actions of 
government in England/Wales have allowed the provision of water services, for 
example drinking water, to be treated more as a commodity in comparison to Ireland. 
In Ireland, the removal of domestic charges has prevented the commodification of 
domestic water services because such consumers do not pay for what they use or are 
perceived as using. 
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Water services in Ireland have been the recipient of substantial EU funding since the 
early 1990s. This contrasts markedly with the provision of water services in 
England/Wales, which have been entirely financed by the consumers of water services 
(overseen by Ofwat, a non-departmental, state sponsored economic regulator). 
Despite these differences in funding arrangements, both countries, since 1990, have 
witnessed increased investment in water services. Also, as highlighted by Figure 1, 
drinking water in England/Wales and Ireland has, since 1990, become increasingly 
compliant with the quality standards of the Directive. In both national contexts, when 
the water industry was under the ownership of national government during the 1970s 
and 1980s, public expenditure on water services decreased as a consequence of 
government limiting public expenditure. This was part of a wider government 
economic strategy to control inflation and restore economic stability. This had a 
detrimental impact upon the ability of water providers to meet the quality standards of 
Directive 80/778/EEC. 
 
The final key difference is related to the role played by national government in 
enforcing the Directive’s standards. Since 1989 the enforcement of the Directive’s 
standards in England/Wales has been the principal responsibility of the Drinking 
Water Inspectorate (DWI), a state sponsored regulatory agency. Lagging some four 
years behind England/Wales, the Irish Government established the EPA with the task 
of monitoring the quality of drinking water. Both these agencies produce annual 
reports on drinking water quality based upon sample data supplied by the providers of 
water services. However, in England/Wales, the DWI is responsible for regulating the 
compliance of privately owned water providers with the standards of the Directive, 
whereas in Ireland the EPA is responsible for regulating compliance by government-
owned and funded providers of water services, notably local authorities. In relation to 
any effect this has had on the impetus to achieve the quality standards of the 
Directive, the DWI in England/Wales has been found to have brought legal 
proceedings against water providers if they fail to meet the quality standards of the 
Directive. For example, in January 2002, Yorkshire Water was fined a total of 
£23,261 following legal proceedings brought by the DWI for failing to supply water 
fit for human consumption (DWI, 2002b). Such prosecutions aim to encourage the 
providers of drinking water in England/Wales to meet the quality standards of the 
Directive. In contrast, the EPA in Ireland has not prosecuted local authorities for 
failing to achieve the quality standards of the Directive. When EPA employees were 
asked why the EPA had not brought any legal proceedings against local authorities 
who breached the Directive’s standards, they argued that such enforcement action 
was not conducive to maintaining a good working relationship with local authorities. 
In effect, the EPA was unlikely to prosecute because such action would result in one 
section of government publicly criticising another, which was to be avoided: 
 
This above situation draws attention to a fundamental difference in the regulatory 
approach to how the standards of the Directive are enforced. In particular, the 
willingness of the DWI, in England/Wales, to bring legal proceedings to enforce the 
standards of the Directive is indicative of a more fixed and legal approach to the 
regulation of drinking water. Whereas in Ireland, the approach of the EPA towards 
regulatory enforcement appears to be more flexible and less legalistic, due to the 
unwillingness of the EPA to take enforcement actions against the providers of 
drinking water.  
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Exploring the impact of organisations. Analysis of the role played by organisations is 
shown to support Winter’s hypotheses that conflicting organisational priorities affect 
the attainment of policy goals. In particular, it is established that problems of drinking 
water quality and transposition occurred in England/Wales and Ireland because of the 
wider economic management of the economy resulting in cuts in expenditure on water 
services, which in turn prevented attainment of the standards of the Directive. Since 
privatisation, the providers of drinking water in England/Wales are established as 
having been able to achieve higher rates of improvement than water providers in 
Ireland. This corresponds with privatisation having accorded water providers in 
England/Wales more independence from government in relation to funding, whereas 
in Ireland the funding of waters services remain firmly under the control of central 
government.  
 
The implementation of the Directive in England/Wales and Ireland is also established 
as having exhibited conflicting policy traditions that negatively impacted upon 
transposition, supporting the contention that conflicting organisational traditions lead 
to failures of implementation. Evidence is forthcoming for Winter’s (1990) suggestion 
that implementation is improved if delegated to supporting institutions. In the context 
of England/Wales, the establishment of the DWI, and the EPA Ireland, are found to 
have had a positive impact upon the implementation of the Directive. 
 
Despite the above insights, due to the similarity of the initial policy traditions in 
government environment departments and the supporting role played by government 
drinking water quality regulators, Winter’s hypotheses do not to explain the impact of 
differing transposition responses of England/Wales and Ireland on drinking water 
quality. Although Winters’ organisational analysis is useful, it does not help to 
explain how groups of organisations interact and collectively impact upon 
implementation, which is potentially important in understanding the outcomes of 
implementation. As a result, attention should also be focused on exploring the impact 
organisational networks can have on transposition and water quality. From the 
perspective of this paper, Winter appears to overlook apparently major organisational 
issues, most notably organisational fragmentation, which appears to have had a 
significant impact upon the ability of policy responses to succeed. Also, with the 
funding of organisations being found to be crucial in enabling the achievement of 
policy goals, Winters organisational focus does appear to be somewhat simplistic. For 
instance, do organisations become more effective when they are accorded more 
independence from government and are assigned clearly defined aims and objectives 
that are support by appropriate and consistent levels of finance? These are important 
issues for future research on drinking water quality and its regulation to consider. 
Indeed, is the secret to good quality drinking water, and its effective protection, as 
straight forward as the previous question indicates? 
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